Why Fujifilm marches on as Kodak flounders!

I sort of expect some witty responses in this thread!

When rubbed onto a digicam will it make the camera's images 'more film like?'
 
Kodak did diversify...

Kodak did diversify...

I worked for Kodak during 1989-1994 when they owned Sterling Drug. They diversified and used their chemistry technology in select areas of pharmaceuticals. They might have made a go of it, but finally decided to divest after losing a large patent infringement case to Polaroid, about 4 billion I believe and that was big money in those days.
In addition to their other businesses, they were actively developing digital technology. They were not behind the ball on this, they clearly anticipated digital would take over, but I believe they underestimated the speed with which their competitors would develop digital and got left behind, not going for the right digital markets. I guess too many players and someone has to lose.
Denton
 
I agree in that Fuji makes better camera's than Kodak but killing off Neopan 1600 entirely & Neopan 400 in 120 isn't saying much for Fuji. Not to mention the other films they have killed off.
 
First of all, Kodak's commitment to film is exponentially greater than Fuji's. Compare their lists, in all sizes. It's obvious. And the film division is their only profitable one.

On the techno-front: Kodak, contrary to many people's thinking, was early into digital and was making sensors and other parts until a few weeks ago when they sold that unit basically for a short-lived cash infusion, which is sad. They concentrated on the higher end, unfortunately, and in the digital realm were beaten badly in the market that they invented and owned for almost a century: the consumer grade, easy to use, affordable, small camera. The real money it seems to me is in $50-$200 point and shoots and, to varying degrees among the big five, in entry-level DSLRs, $500-$800. (The mirrorless market is right there at the bottom of this segment now too.) Kodak lost badly in the first and made no attempt at the second. But they were essential first in digital in 1991 with the Professional DCS (Digital Camera System) offering 1.3 megapixel image capture. It was a Nikon F3 with a modified motor and a rear screen that connected to this big box thing where the images were stored. Below are two open source images from the outstanding mir.com.my site.
 
continued...

Anyway from here on Kodak was all about the CCD sensor. Oops. In the end digital wasn't their problem: marketing was their problem. People believed Kodak was old and everyone else was new. Except all the companies using their high-end sensors, such as Leica. But that was invisible to the consumer and nowadays, to steal a phrase from old Bill Clinton, the consumer decides what the meaning of is is.

http://www.mir.com.my/rb/photography/companies/Kodak/index.htm
 
Check that page linked above for the images. The system isn't letting me copy them over -- I put them in the message box and get a warning that my message has too many characters.
 
Kodak was doomed in pro SLRs because there was no infrastructure at Kodak (or in the United States) for any part of an SLR but the imaging board. It was able to market complete cameras by buying the shells and mechanical parts from Canon and Nikon, and word is that once those companies started getting into higher-end equipment, their interest in selling to Kodak (and Fuji) diminished greatly. Don't underestimate the problems you might run into when you are a U.S.-based, non-keiretsu business trying to tap into supply lines that exist only in Japan. Nikon, I'm sure, was the window.

Dante
 
I'm not sure the term should be 'killed off.' If a product isn't profitable or isn't generating the level of revenues necessary to make it worth the time, then perhaps the product is already dead. 🙂
 
I agree in that Fuji makes better camera's than Kodak but killing off Neopan 1600 entirely & Neopan 400 in 120 isn't saying much for Fuji. Not to mention the other films they have killed off.

+1. I read that Neopan 400 in 120 was discontinued for some sort of environmental reason, but I can't imagine what it could be. Stopping production of Neopan 1600--well, that's a real disappointment!
 
Kodak can go on with only film production for small, niche market. Ilford is doing it, Foma, Efke. What I amm affraid of, for those big guys fro Kodak that might look like disgrace and they might rather shoot themself in the head instead of becoming small. And Kodak is, I belive, supplying at list half of B&W film for still photography. With them gone it will be a mess. I wouldn't count on Fuji to step into that place.
 
Why Fujifilm marches on as Kodak flounders...?

--Don’t Be Fooled By Randomness


I'm fascinated that when a door is slammed in Fuji's face they find another way to make money. Kodak seem not to be able to do this.

One company appears to have a plan for it's future survival by diversifying at the earliest opportunity and one just seems to be involved in fire sales to get itself out of the crap! That's floundering in my book!
 
Kodak's problems stem from their top management. In the past (until some time around 1990) Kodak was run by, and listened to scientists. Now Kodak is run by lawyers.

When I read that they believe they can become profitable by suing other technology companies for patent and copyright violations, I wondered if it was a Jon Levitt "that's the ticket" routine. They come off as con artists.

I liked what Audrey Jonckheer, Kodak's marketing director had to say, but I am not sure I believe her (she is, after all, under the control of her evil masters.) None-the-less, I hope it's true.
 
Worse. Salesmen. Audrey is Old School Kodak, i.e. she knows what she is talking about.

Cheers,

R.

Here I'm not too optimistic about Old School Kodak. Companies run by engineers don't necessarily fare better than companies run by salesmen. The latter are admittedly often more sleazy, but likewise often less naive, and often have a better idea of what customers actually want. (Leica is a case in point - run into the ground by engineers, and saved by salesmen and a value-added, high-profile, luxury goods strategy.)

Fuji "marches on" because it's today not a film company anymore. Even if Audrey's profitable film division was spun off as a separate company and successfully continued to make film, the two would be in completely different leagues and the new "Kodakfilm" would be a shadow of its former self.

Kodak simply didn't manage this transition. This kind of failure is, in my opinion, almost always a management problem and points at deep-seated cultural problems inside a company.

What would interest me most about the whole situation is what the atmosphere in Rochester (the city) was like for the last five or ten years. It must have been pretty much a company town. When you're a manager in a town that more or less exists around your company, I'd suspect you can easily lose touch with reality. From seeing a number of similar companies, one of the problems at Kodak seems to have been this relative disconnection.
 
Fuji remains innovative and not stuck on old ideas and habits. When overwhelmed by by-products of film production, instead of throwing them out, Fuji branched off into cosmetics.
 
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